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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -
JUDICIAL POWER - STANDING TO SUE
Horace Mann League of the United States, Inc. v. Board of
Pub. Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 97 (1966).
The recent case of Horace Mann League of the United States,
Inc. v. Board of Pub. Works,1 illustrates some of the problems the
standing to sue question entails.2 Individual taxpayers and the
Horace Mann League (a non-profit corporation) brought suit for
an injunction and a declaration that four state statutes providing
outright matching grants for building construction to four private
colleges were repugnant to the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Con-
stitution. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Horace
Mann League lacked standing as a non-profit educational and chari-
table corporation but that the individual taxpayers did have standing
to sue, thereby rejecting the defendant's contention that the inter-
ests of the plaintiffs in the challenged programs were miniscule and
that they would not have had standing in a similar action instituted
in a federal court.3 Upon reaching the merits of the case, the Mary-
land high court concluded that the statutes applying to three of the
colleges, although valid under Maryland law, violated the federal
constitution.4 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.5
The purpose here is to focus attention upon the standing issues
which should have been considered by the Supreme Court if certio-
rari had been granted.
The 1923 landmark decision of Frothingham v. Mellone enun-
1242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
2 The concept of limited federal jurisdiction is attended by constitutionally pre-
scribed and judicially imposed standards. In order to successfully invoke the power of
a federal court, a party must be able to show the existence of a "justiciable case or con-
troversy." See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Furthermore, the
party must be able to demonstrate his "standing to sue," which presently may be de-
fined as the right to invoke the jurisdictional power of the court premised upon the
assertion of a dear, direct injury suffered or likely to be suffered. See Frothingham
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
3The court noted that in cases where the issues are of "great public interest and
concern," the injury or interest to the taxpayer to sustain standing is "'broadly com-
prehensive' and may be 'slight."' 242 Md. at 653, 220 A.2d at 54.
4 1d. at 676, 220 A.2d at 68. The fourth college was found to be non-sectarian.
Ibid.
5 Horace Mann League of the United States, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Works, 385 U.S.
97 (1966).
6 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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ciated the rule that a taxpayer has no standing to contest in a
federal court the validity of a federal appropriations statute. In
Frothingham the United States Supreme Court held that a tax-
payer's interest in funds realized from federal taxation is miniscule
and indeterminable; therefore, a single taxpayer could not demon-
strate a direct injury sustained, or likely to be sustained, that is dis-
tinguishable from the indefinite injury incurred by taxpayers gen-
erally.' The Court distinguished between the federal taxpayer's
remote interest in federal appropriations and the direct interest of
a local taxpayer in local expenditures.8
That the Constitution limits the federal judicial power to "cases
and controversies" is clear,9 but it is difficult to determine what
role judicial discretion plays in satisfaction of that requirement.
Where the Court has permitted the plaintiff standing to represent
the interests of a third party, the exercise of discretion is obvious,
but whether the Court has discretionary power where the plaintiff
is the injured party is less dear. The authority which must be
employed to resolve the issue is, of course, the constitutional provi-
sion that "the judicial Power shall extend to all Cases."" However,
dicta espoused by the venerable Chief Justice Marshall restricts the
meaning of the otherwise liberal language of the Constitution,
12
and has resulted in a split of authority regarding the proper interpre-
tation of judicial "power."' 3  It does seem at least tenable that the
7Id. at 486-88. The Court's language throughout the opinion implies an unstated
premise that artide III affirmatively imposes the standing requirement.
81d. at 487. In Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1879), where the plaintiff
was challenging a county expenditure relative to the exercise of eminent domain, the
Court did not pass on the plaintiff's standing. For criticism of this distinction,
see 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRAIVB LAW TREATISE § 22.09 (1958); Jaffe, Standing To
Secure judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L REV. 1265, 1292 (1961).
9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See note 8 supra.
10 E.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925). Contra, Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). Standing of the
jus tertii generis is not discussed herein. It is significant to note that the impracticabil-
ity of an injured party to assert his rights is the most frequent reason advanced for the
Court's discretionary grant of standing to a third party asserting those rights. For a com-
prehensive and analytical treatment of the area, see Sedler, Standing To Assert Constitu-
tional Ius Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
11 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. (Emphasis added.)
12 In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the Chief Justice stated:
"We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given." Id. at 404. (Emphasis added.)
1-3 Professor Wechsler, who adheres to the Marshall dicta, replied to Judge Hand's
proposition that the Court may, in a case properly before it, decline to hear it because
the occasion is not urgent enough: "Ihere is no such escape from the judicial obliga-
tion; the duty can not be attenuated in this way." Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 6 (1959). (Emphasis added.) For a
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Constitution does not require the Court to exercise jurisdiction as a
matter of duty,14 and, of course, the federal courts can not exercise
jurisdiction where the requirement of "case or controversy" is not
fulfilled.'5
Unquestionably, any determination of directness involves the
exercise of discretion.'" While the Frothingham Court rejected the
plaintiff's interest as being de minimis, it failed to provide any meas-
urement of directness. A comment by Professor Jaffe may seem
to provide the missing criterion: "The major premise here is that a
court is not competent to adjudicate the legality of the action of a
coordinate branch unless the plaintiff is threatened with 'direct in-
jury' . . . ."" The quoted statement implies that directness is an
issue of primary importance only where the plaintiff is challenging
the action of a co-equal branch. Under this interpretation of the
Frothingham precedent, a federal taxpayer would not have standing
unless the asserted interest outweighed the policy of respecting the
doctrine of separation of powers, whereas a state taxpayer would
have standing in a federal court to challenge a state statute because
the action of a co-equal branch of the federal government would
not be in dispute. Aside from the specious implications of Pro-
fessor Jaffe's comment, stumbling blocks created by stare decisis
clutter the path forward.
In 1929 the Supreme Court, relying upon Frothingham, held
that a state taxpayer had no standing in a federal court to challenge
the constitutionality of a state gasoline tax.'" Eighteen years later
the Court decided, on the merits, Everson v. Board of Eduvc.' The
case challenged, on first amendment grounds, the validity of a town-
ship's appropriation of state funds made pursuant to a state statute
which authorized local school districts to make rules and contracts
for the transportation of children to schools. Although the case
criticism of Professor Wechsler's viewpoint, see Bickle, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term,
75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 43 (1961).
14 See id. at 43; Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75
HARv. L REV. 255, 304 (1961).
'- U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
36 Comment, Constitutional Limitation: Standing To Sue in the Supreme Court, 8
ST. Louis U.LJ. 83, 90 (1963).
17 Jaffe, supra note 8, at 1308. Professor Jaffe disapproves of the absoluteness of
the premise he deduces. Ibid.
18 Wiliams v. Riley, 280 U.S. 78, 80 (1929). Quaere, whether federalism may
be the vertical outward limit and separation of powers the horizontal? The tenth
amendment expressly establishes federalism.
'" 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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appears to stand for the proposition that a state taxpayer has stand-
ing in the Supreme Court to challenge a state appropriation, it in
fact does not,2" because the taxpayer was challenging a district ap-
propriation ' merely authorized by a state statute."
What Everson did not decide, Doremus v. Board of Educ.28 did.
In Doremus, taxpayers challenged the practice of bible reading in
a local school pursuant to a state statutory requirement. The Su-
preme Court, on appeal from a state court determination that the
statute was valid," denied the plaintiffs' standing: "Without dis-
paraging the availability of the remedy by taxpayer's action to re-
strain unconstitutional acts which result in direct pecuniary injury,
we reiterate what the Court said [in Frothingham] of a federal
statute as equally true when a state act is assailed ... "25 Thus,
Doremus stands for the proposition that a taxpayer can attack a
state statute on federal constitutional grounds in a state court but
not in the Supreme Court, even on appeal from the state court,
unless somehow he manages to demonstrate a "direct injury" dis-
tinguishable from that incurred "in common with people gener-
ally."2
6
Other cases, similar in factual terms, which tend to further
obfuscate the standing question, are nevertheless distinguishable. 7
Part of the difficulty lies in the failure to recognize areas of "direct
effect" other than those amenable to pecuniary measurement Wei-
man v. UpdegraffJ8 was originally instituted as a taxpayer's suit,
2 0 See WIsIiT, FEMZAI. COURTS § 13 (1963). But see Jaffe, supra note 8, at
1312.
2 1 This analysis would place Everson in the same category as Crampton v. Za-
briskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1879). For a discussion of this case, see note 8 supra. Appar-
ently the Court attaches no significance to the fact that a local taxpayer's monetary
interest may be slight. Despite a miniscule interest, Everson had standing in the Su-
preme Court.
22 If Everson had attacked a state appropriation, he would not have had standing.
See note 8 supra.
23 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
24 Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950).
25 342 U.S. at 434. The Court also said that the plaintiffs had not brought a
"good faith pocketbook action." Ibid. It is significant to note that plaintiffs were
both municipal and state taxpayers. If the plaintiffs had brought a "good faith pocket-
book action," they would have had standing as municipal taxpayers.
26 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
27 Compare Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (child graduated
before appeal), with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (children were presently
enrolled - parents had standing). See Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. In-
struction, 377 U.S. 402 (1964) (per curiam); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963).
28 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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but by the time it reached the Supreme Court it was more the
suit of a college professor threatened with dismissal.2" Where the
plaintiff is threatened with palpable injury, the issue of standing
is resolved in his favor.3" In Adler v. Board of Educ.,31 the Court
was silent on the standing question, thus rendering analysis more
difficult yet manageable.
32
This background has been given for the purpose of focusing
upon the standing issues presented by Horace Mann League of the
United States, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Works.'u Frothingham and Dore-
mus stand for the proposition that a federal or state taxpayer may
have his action heard in a state court but can not be heard in a
federal court unless he meets the "direct effect" test, even though
his challenge is on federal constitutional grounds.8 4 It is submitted
that the founding fathers did not foresee the anomalous situation
resulting from the Frothingham and Doremus decisions when they
created limited federal jurisdiction. 5 It may be conceded that the
state courts are bound by the supremacy clause,36 but the clause in
itself does not preclude the possibility of having different state
courts, although diligent in applying the federal constitution, ar-
rive at distinct and even mutually exclusive rules of constitutional
law. The supremacy clause on its face demonstrates the founders'
intent to have certain legal principles interpreted uniformly through-
out the United States.37 The very essence of limited jurisdiction per-
suasively evinces the moment to be accorded the concept of federal
power and national sovereignty in light of the supremacy clause.
29 Cf. United Pub. Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
30 E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (criminal conviction); Evers
v. Devyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (per curiam) (Negro plaintiff threatened with arrest
on bus); United Pub. Workers of America v. Afitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (Hatch Act
violator about to lose his job).
31342 U.S. 485 (1952) (parents, taxpayers, unaffected teachers attacked New York
Feinberg Law).
32 See the analysis of Sedler, supra note 10, at 643.
53 242 Md. 645,220 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
34 Quaere, whether a three-judge federal court could grant an injunction restrain-
ing enforcement of a statute or could stay the proceedings of a state court in such a
predicament? 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1964). It is unlikely that either action could
be taken because there would be no "case or controversy" and perhaps because the
express terms articulated in the statutory provisions are too restrictive.
36 See TlH FEDERALIsT No. 80 (Hamilton).
88 "In the scheme of the Constitution, they [state courts) are the primary guaran-
tors of constitutional rights .... " Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Juris-
diction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L REV. 1362, 1401
(1953).
3 7 
'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States... and all Treaties made
... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2.
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Yet, despite the plausible language of article III, "the judicial power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court," the
founders may have unwittingly provided an exception by molding
the "case or controversy" requirement."
Because the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari, the Mary-
land court's decision will be the final determination of a dispute
grounded upon federal constitutional principles. The problem is
not that the Court would not grant certiorari but that it could not
under prevailing rules of law. The issue is intensified when cog-
nizance is taken of the egregious predicament encountered where
a citizen has standing as a parent but not as a taxpayer, even though
in either instance the same constitutional grounds are asserted. The
rationale is that a parent's interest is direct while the taxpayer's
interest is indirect. Clearly, the Court applies two separate stand-
ards: when evaluating a parent's interest, the Court looks no fur-
ther than the parent-child relationship; when measuring a taxpayer's
interest, the Court looks to his proportionate interest in the total
revenue collected from all taxpayers." Therefore, a citizen will
be heard to complain that bible reading in the schools abridges
first amendment rights so long as his child is enrolled in school,4"
but when the child graduates, the citizen's interest in the separation
of church and state (bible reading in the schools) expires.4 The
rationale is not convincing, for the consequential void in the Su-
preme Court's power to hear appeals from the highest state tribunal
is not so readily justified.
Professor Davis poses the following question: In an appeal from
a state court to the Supreme Court, what should govern the stand-
ing issue: state law, federal law, or an intermediate view?4" The
Court can not apply the state law without overruling the Doremus
and Frothingham decisions.43 Even if those decisions were over-
38 See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1929). Note, however, that the founders did not intend that the
limited jurisdiction of the federal courts be exclusive. Also, other limitations upon
judicial power are extant in the Constitution, e.g., Congress may make exceptions to
and regulate the appellate jurisdiction. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
89 ComPare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), with Frothingham v. Mel-
lon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The Frothingham reasoning did go further. The Court
said that the taxpayer could not know if his tax dollars were appropriated to the chal-
lenged program. Id. at 486. If he could know, his interest would be direct. See
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). But see note 43 infra.
40 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
4 1 Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
42 3 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 8, § 22.17.
43 Dictum in the Doremus case indicates that the Court may review a state court
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ruled, the problem is not so amenable to solution. The only policy
favoring such a resolution is that the taxpayer ought to be heard
to challenge legislative appropriations which may be unconstitu-
tional. The adoption of state standing requirements would not
effect uniformity. Moreover, what theory can justify the adoption
of state standing requirements in federal courts hearing federal con-
stitutional challenges? 44 Any theory advanced would be incongru-
ous with the concept of federalism.
Should the Supreme Court continue to apply the Frothingham
and Doremus tests to the issue of standing? Arguments in the
affirmative are not easily dismissed. If the outward horizontal limit
of directness-discretion is the doctrine of separation of powers, the
Frothingham decision may be intrinsically wise. After all, the
citizen-taxpayer is not deprived of his ultimate sanction in democ-
racy - the election ballot.46 The Doremus case may be similarly
treated. The negative aspects of the present federal standing cri-
teria are several: it is too absolute a rule;4" it is not compatible
with the spirit of the Constitution; and it deprives the citizen-
taxpayer of his right to have his contentions, premised on the Con-
stitution, heard by the most appropriate forum.
Intermediate views (as distinguished from compromise views)
have been proposed. Professor Freund would make standing a
federal question if a constitutional issue were involved. 8 It has
also been suggested that a single suit be restricted to state questions
decision where the disputed statute provides injunctive relief. 342 U.S. at 434. For
a review of such statutes, see Comment, Taxpayers' Suits - A Survey and Summary,
69 YALE LJ. 895 (1960). This would not be a solution to the problem because the
prerogative to establish the criteria would be with the state legislature and not the
Supreme Court. Cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
44 Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
45 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
46 Congress may be adopting the foregoing view. The Senate, on July 29, 1966,
passed S. 2097, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) authorizing taxpayer suits in the federal
district court for the District of Columbia in order to test the constitutionality of nine
federal laws which provide for grants and loans to religious institutions. 24 CONG.
Q. 1727 (weekly rep. Aug. 12, 1966). A prior attempt failed in the Senate although
it passed the House. H.R. Doc. No. 4643, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 51 (1949).
47 See Jaffe, supra note 8, at 1310.
48 SUPREME COURT Am SuPREME LAw 35 (Cahn ed. 1954). This approach
would allow the taxpayer an appeal from the adverse judgment of a state court. The
Supreme Court would still be able to control the volume of cases it would hear be-
cause an appeal may be denied for "want of a substantial federal question." See
Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HARv. L. R.v. 20, 51 (1954). This
view, however, otherwise cogent, does not preclude the issue of directness of interest,
and therefore it would seem that the Court would be compelled to dismiss the tax-
payer's suit because his interests are minute.
1967] 1045
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
in the state court and to federal questions in the federal court.49
Professor Jaffe advocates a "public action," designed to test official
conduct whether or not the expenditure of funds is involved, in
which a citizen, as the prime political unit of democracy, is the
plaintiff.50
Horace Mann League of the United States, Inc. v. Board of
Pub. Works"' squarely presented the jurisdictional issue of whether
a taxpayer has standing in the Supreme Court to contest the con-
stitutionality of a state appropriation where the substantive issue is
a matter of "great public interest and concern."52  Although the
public action concept has not thus far received recognition by the
Court, the concept is both feasible and realistic. Whether or not
there is "great public interest and concern" is a question to be
pondered by the Court, and the answer will depend upon the Court's
own analysis. Such analysis necessitates the establishment of flexi-
ble criteria and the employment of discretion. Manifestations of
public interest are abundant - for example, continual litigation or
widespread controversy - and judicial notice of them need only be
taken.5" The Court should weigh the calculated public interest
against the self-imposed limitations upon the judicial power54 to
determine whether "public interest and concern" is "great" and
therefore merits adjudication. Existing doctrines, such as "ripe-
ness,"55 and "immediacy"" are desirable criteria and should be in-
49 Jaffe, supra note 8, at 1311 n.132. But see England v. Board of Medical Exam-
iners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
50jaffe, supra note 8, at 1296. The Court's propensity has been to restrict rather
than to expand the interest necessary to constitute standing. For instance, it has been
held that the injury must be to a "legal" right. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA,
306 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ikes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938). But see FCC
v. Sanders, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). Still another possibility would be to allow the
plaintiff to sue as the representative of all persons similarly affected. Cf. Brown v.
Trousdale, 138 U.S. 389 (1891) (taxpayer computed loss of all taxpayers to establish
jurisdiction amount). But cf. Colvin v. Jacksonville, 158 U.S. 456, 460-61 (1895)
(semble).
51 242 Md. 645,220 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
52 Id. at 653, 220 A.2d at 54.
53 Some suggested examples are: public opinion polls; legislative committee re-
ports; pertinent political issues; the formation of citizen committees and organizations;
and newspaper and newsweekly editorial commentaries.
54 Although under the public action theory herein advanced directness of interest
is not the test to determine standing (the test is "great public interest and concern"),
the Court must nevertheless continue to respect the self-imposed outer limits of judi-
cial power: separation of powers and federalism.
55 
"Ripeness" is the Court-made rule that issues will not be decided if they are
not dearly framed, concretely founded, and of discernible ramifications.
56 "Immediacy" is the common law equivalent to the civil law concept of desue-
tude. It is the rule that the constitutionality of a statute will not be decided if it has
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corporated into the determinative test of "great public interest and
concern." Noteworthy is the fact that the Court will not inevitably
be burdened with a prodigious docket: discretion is not compulsion.
The Court will be free to continue its practice of selecting for re-
view only .those cases it deems eminently important. Most remark-
able, however, is the consequence of the public action concept: it
fills the objectionable vacuum in the Supreme Court's judicial power
by permitting judicial review of legislative appropriation acts. Fur-
ther, it offers to the citizen-taxpayer a judicial alternative to his
political sanction as a voter when he is aggrieved by the appropria-
tion of tax money - an alternative he has always had with respect
to other types of legislation of questionable constitutionality.
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in the Hor-
ace Mann case. Public interest and concern were sufficiently mani-
fest, 7 and the self-imposed discretionary barrier had been removed.5"
The Court should therefore have found that the taxpayer-petitioners
had standing. This would have required the overruling of Froth-
ingham and Doremus insofar as those cases applied the de minimis
doctrine in order to deny the plaintiffs' standing.
ALAN B. GEORGE
not been enforced and foreseeably will not be enforced to the detriment of anyone's
rights.
57 Forty-eight of the fifty states have statutory or constitutional provisions prohibit-
ing the appropriation of public funds to schools with religious affiliations. Horace
Mann league of the United States, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Works, 242 Md. 645, 690,
220 A.2d 51, 76, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966). The first amendment of the
Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " Yet Congress is likely to soon
enact legislation providing for grants and loans to religious institutions, including
schools and colleges.
5 5 Horace Mann was heard by the Maryland courts, and, furthermore, it was the
State of Maryland that requested certiorari from the Supreme Court.
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